The Ethics of Partiality
Being There for One Another
We are far from impartial in our everyday lives. We frequently do things for people with whom we share certain special relationships that we would not do for equally deserving strangers, and we take ourselves to have good reason – moral reason – for being partial in this way. But how can this be justified? Commentators on the ethics of partiality frequently reference the intrinsic, final, or non-instrumental value of special relationships to explain why some partiality towards those with whom we share them is normatively appropriate, if not morally obligatory. In The Ethics of Partiality: Being There for One Another, Robbie Arrell explains how a focus on not only the ways in which we value special relationships, but also the ways in which they are robustly demanding yields a more compelling account of partiality that can bring a fresh perspective to a number of substantive issues in the discourse. Key amongst these are questions about the conditions under which special reasons of partiality translate into associative duties; whether the duties we have towards our countries and compatriots are properly associative duties; whether there exists a genuine tension between associative and general duties; and whether we can ever owe our loved ones that which cannot be impartially justified.
I am currently at the advanced stages of securing a reputable publishing home for this book manuscript.